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Revolutionary Development
in the Republic of Viet Nam
The scope of this st udy is three-fold.

It attempts

mainly to explore United States involvement in the Republic
of Viet Nam from the perspectives of the history, the a ims
and the effectiveness of the pacification program.
The rationale for the use of such a method as pacification in tne rural areas of Viet Nam may be traced back at
least as far as the beginning of Western colonial interests
there.

Saigon submitted to colonial rule by France in 1885.

French control came to an abrupt halt when the colony was
surrendered without a struggle to Japan in 194.0 by the proNazi Admiral Decoux.

After fifty-five years of French dom-

ination, the entire Indochinese area had 2% of its children
in school.
prisons.
i

--

Not including work camps, there were eighty-one
The territory of present-day Laos had only one

native docto·r ..

After 1940 French bureaucrats in Viet Nam

worked for Japan.

During the year 194.3 the bureaucracy

spent 71,000 piastres for hospitals and 4}z million for opium
distributed through the official opium monopoly.l South
Viet Nam under French rule had had one doctor for every
120,000 people.

Even today there are only 1000 South Viet-

namese doctors for a total population of 15 million, and 700
~re

in the armed forces.

"The other 300 have the right

connections or have bought their way out.

Of course, in

private practice, they make up for it by chargitig outrageous

2.

£ees."2 This situation poses severe problems, especially
with the nonurban population which makes up 80% of Viet
Nam.
As an infant nation, Viet Nam naturally has had a
a difficult struggle to survive the many political and
economic traumas concomitant with devel9pment.

Yet because

of the ravages of long years of war and dislocation of the
peasants, Viet Nam--more than other parts of the

11

third

world", is "out of the habit" of attempting to be a productive society.

The United States has been partially respon-

sible for this attitude through an overabundance of aid.
Whenever there is a shortage, the American government immediately sends in supplies.

The people have been rapidly

developing a "dole complex."3 This ever-present atmosphere
is being combatted by the Self-Help portion of p acification.
1961 was a key year for the beginning of direct United
States participation in pacification.

Pr•e sident Kennedy

was attempting to make peace with Laos while trying to win
the war in Viet Nam.

Although Kennedy supported the Ngo

regime, he was violently opp osed to its anti-Buddhist bias.
(Kennedy publicly denounced the anti-Buddhist policies of
the Ngos before the United Nations in September, 1963.)
There were three missions sent to Viet Nam in 1961:
President Johnson in April;

Vice

Professor Eugene Staley of

Stanford Research Institute from May to July;

and,

General Maxwell Taylor--the most prestigious military adviser and Walt Rostow--the mo s t respected civilian adviser-in September.

The Staley mission was by f'ar the most impor-

tant of' the three.4
Although the Staley Report was of' an essentially civilian nature, very f'ew nonmilitary recommendations were made.
None of Staley.ts proposals considered the political changes
most observers believed were necessary.? Staley devised a
stra,tegy that was meant to be applied for two years.

But.

more than this, the plan defined an entire war policy.
Staley stayed in Saigon for six weeks, was aided by the Vietnamese economist--Vu Quoc Thuc(a law prof'essor in Saigon) and
was directed by Ngo Dinh Nhu(Diem1s brother and political
adviser.)6
The original pacif'ication idea was to est ablish strategic hamlets only in areas "that had already been more or
less recaptured."

The placing of a hamlet in Viet Gong-

held territory would be too risky.

If' it fell, the confi-

dence of the people might be lost.

In order to secure max-

imum government control of' the countryside, most Vietnamese
military of'ficials wanted to fit the rural hamlet system into
the social structure of the peasantry.7
Specific recommendations of the Staley Report included:
enlargement of ARVN f'orces to 170,000 and an increase of its
anti-guerrilla training;

supplying the Dan-V~(Village Militia)

with modern arms and radio equipment;
(Civil Guard) to 120,000 men;

doubling the Bao-An

building strategic hamlets

and villages and increasing the agrovilles from twenty-two
to one hundred in a year's time.8 The chief military emphasis was on the village militia.

All soldiers, however, were

to receive some psychological training because certain sources
within the United States(notably

~magazine)

had stated

that poor behavior on the part of government soldiers was
largely responsible for bad feeling aga inst the Saigon administration.

The agroville(khu

~mat)

experiment, which

had been attempted three years ago, was to be resumed.
Strategic hamlets were to be set up to surround the agrovilles
so

th~t

peasants could retreat to the hamlets after having

worked in the agro-cities during the day.

In this way pro-

tecti on would be given to 800,000 persons out of a rural
population of eight million(i.e., 10% of the farming pOpf'
ulation.)

A very important trui sm emerges here:

"Staley's

economic program was dependent upon the mobilization of
consid erable,military means.n9
The

~

chien luoc (strategiq hamlet) program of rural

develppment was formally launChed on Februrary 3, 1962 by
presidential decree. A basic unit was thus provided through
which Saigon mi ght control the countryside w.hile giving
the peasantry a certain amount of self-determina tion.
Diem's fall

~chien ~continued

After

as the New Life Hamlet

Program.

It is presently known in the United States as

Revolutionary Development.lO
Gargantuan amounts of internal corruption coupled with
Viet Gong disru ption of transportation, communication and
commerce h ave caused United States of fici als to believe that
somethi.ng more than the convent i onal AID program is needed
in Viet Narn.

In the year

19 6 _5, ~·- 1_500

local government officials,

school teachers, he alth workers and agricultural agents were
either killed or kidnapped.

One m.i. ght add that over two-

thirds of the able-bodied men from t wenty to thirty ye ars of'
age are and have been involved in some ph a se of the war.
Inflation and losses in the living standard caused by decreased domestic production a re ever-p re sent dang ers.ll
The bulk of American non-military aid to Viet Nam for the
past few ye ars, ther efore, h a s worked "to h e lp fe e d t h e
people, keep the civil economy functioning and fore s tall
runaway infl ation."l2
The: current Revolutionary Development effort is explained
by the United States Agency for International Development as
"a process through which the Government of Vietnam is attempting to secure its countryside from Viet Gong terrorism and
other forms of illegal activity and, at the same time, to
bui ld a new and more promis i n g life for its rural peopl e."
The AID h as outli ned three phases of pa cification.

First,

there is a "clearing" phase in which mi litary forces are

I
o.

deployed to eliminate Viet Cong guerrilla bands from the
area to be secured.

Second, during "securing" military

forces keep a shield around the area while security forces
attempt to eliminate or cripple Viet Gong political control
(the Viet Gong "infrastructure".)

In this phase the Revolu-

tionary Development Cadre begin restoring local governmental
structures which will relate to the administration in Saigon.
Basic economic and social improvements are also included in
in the sec1.:tri ty phase.

The third step is called "develop-

ment•" It provides for more social and economic betterment,
which will pave the way for development of the country when
peace finally arrives.
The AIDrole in New Life or Revolutionary Development
places heavy emphasis on the efforts of the Vietnamese working together in local projects.

In self-help programs, farmers

and villagers supply the labor and in many cases funds while
the governments of Viet Nam and of the United States give
necessary funds and materials Which are too expensive for
the local people.

In order to further education in rural areas,

hamlet schools, teachers and instructional materials are
provided by the government.

Rural public works projects

construct communal roads and increase rural electrification.
In an animal husbandry plan farmers are given livestock on
a credit basis along with training on how to increase their
holdings.

Agricultural irrigation for improvement of crop

production and a rural health program are being instituted.
Finally, there are many other smaller projects which

attem~

to augument rural income.l3
As has been noted, there are many very positive aspects
to Revolutionary Development as outlined by the AID.
one must submit the program to an acid test:
has it been?

Yet

how effective

In 1963 an overextension of the hamlets almost

completely obliterated

ti~em.

Peter Arnett of the Associated

Press repor·t:;ed April 21, 1967 that the American government
wants teams to work only where maximum security is in effect
in order to avoid another such catastrophe.

In the same news

dispatch Arnett explained hoitl people around communist war ·
zones are being resettled.

A "scorched e arth" policy is

destroying all living things in the evacuted areas in order
to starve out the enemy.
squalor of the

The people, however, tire of the

~esettlement

family burial grounds again.

camps and want to see their
They return to the forbidden

areas and make themselves targets.l4
Even the minister of Revolutionary Development, Major
General Nguyen Due Thang, admi tt ed publicly on November 11,
1966

th~t . ~he

goals.

pacificati on program had fallen short of its

T.heng's criticism centered on the New Life Hamlet

Program(which he referred to as "old life" hamlets.)

Tha

new life hamlets were said not to have provided any sem·b lance of a new life.

Thang listed the l ack of any real

8.

~social

revolution, r esentment caused by forced labor and

communists remaining in suppos e dly secure are as as reasons
for the dearth of progress. · He proposed the giving of
$33.9 million to the program in 1967(a 40% increase) . and
allowing the people to control the hamlets instead of the RD
cadres.l5
Late in 1966 an . American source on pacification was
quoted as saying:

"Whatever progress has been ma de has been

ma de by knerican, South Kor e an or Australian security.

The

South Vietnamese themselves h ave scored enough failures to
offset this.

The re s ult of this ambitious pro gram, so far,

is that not a single Province in the entire country is
absolute secure."

The l argest problem seems to be with the

South Vietnamese bureaucracy which the United States i s
supporting.

Many aid materials simply do not get from Saigon

to the rural areas.

"[GraftJ appears not so much the fault

of the AID as the White House.• s own top-level decisi on to
keep, in eve ry Wqy, from interfering with the South Vietn ame se government.nl6 If the program continues at its
present rate, it will require 89 years to pacify the 2.500
villages in South Viet Nam."l7
Robert

w.

Komer, special assistant to the president and

now civilian he ad of pacification, reported to President
Johnson on September 13, 1966 that since the Honolulu con..ference of February 6 through 8, 1966, many concrete improvements

have been made•

To counter inflation the Vietnamese piastre

was devaluated 50%(now worth 118 piastres to the dollar.)
Electrical power has been given to 135 rural localities.
Port congestion was reduced, and customs duties and domestic
taxes were increased.

The cost of living stopped rising

by late summer, and . conf'i dence in the piastre grew stronger.
(See Appendix II.)

The mos.t important and immeasurable aspect

of the rural pacification program.is that the people have
learned, in some instances, to work together non projects
which benefit a large group.

This factor alone sets a prece-

dent for most of Southeast Asia.l8
The eighth organizational change in the South Vietnamese pacification program was annotmced May 12,1967.
United States military forces took over the bulk of the
work of pacification.

Although the Agency for International

Development and the Office of Civilian Operations will
remain in South Viet Nam, they will no longer govern pacification.

All of the ultimate decisions now pass to the

senior military man in each of South Viet Nam 1 s four corps
areas.

A conservative estimate states that the United States

troop total will climb to at least 700,000 quite soon.

One

civilian sourc e argued against the military takeover:

"The

merger is a little like taking all the welfare agencies in
New York City and putting them under the police commissioner.
We've got different backgrounds, different problems and

10.

different ways of doing things."
the change was security.
wo~k

in 59-man teams.

The prime r e ason given for

The 20 1 000 pa cification officials

Because of lax military surveillance,

220 have already been killed by the Viet Gong so far in
19 6 7."1~

We have seen that American motives in pacifica tion seem
to be "good."

With ma ssive assist ance of men and dollars,

the government of the United States feels that it can change
ancient p atterns of life

Q~

thi nking--almost tt overni ght. u

If p acificati on fails the war is not neces s arily lost, but
there is certain to be more destruction.

Arnett predicts

that the entire com1try of Viet Nrun may have the same
appearance a s the southern delta if i t "resists pacification"
for the eighth time: .... ~ ••• the war has virtually overrun the
whole population.

Paddy fields are

over g row~,

homes de stroyed,

dikes broken and the p6pul a tian gone."20 The American government must ultimately b e posed with s ev eral very c r ucial questions.

Is the capitalistic s y stem the only workable solution

to the problems of a develo ping nation?

Is it possible to

superimpose a Protestant socioeconomic structure on an Oriental
culture?

Finally, do i-Je as a nation have the right to play

God in Southeast Asia?

11.
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Appendix I.

Contradictions

In doing research work on a problem as complicated as
the current United States commitments in Viet
encounters many contradictory statements.

Nam~

one

Considering the

differing views on the Viet Nam conflict, this would only
seem natural.

One concrete discre pancy occurred between

two conservative news media:

Associated Press and the

Saturday Evening Post.
11

Westmoreland ••• will h ave a civilian deputy heading up

the United States pacification work.

44,

He is Robert

w.

Komer,

special a ssistant to President Johnson, who is known to

approve the milit ary takeover."---Arkansas Gazette, Friday,
May 12, 19Q7
" ••• the President's two chief civilian advisers on
the conduct of the war--Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
and White House aide Robert Komer--both oppose giving
American forces the pacification mission. 11
Post, P• 26.

Saturday Evening

15.

Appendix II. AID information
on organization and success of pacification
More specific information is given at the end o£ the
Komer report on pacification successfulness(published as
The Other War

!a Yi£i

~--A

Progress Report.)

Komer

details work in pacification during the seven-month period
from the Honolulu conference of February, 1966 to the
date of the report--September, 1966.
A major goal of the Honolulu conference was the
continued emphasis on rural construction work.

In addition

to successes given on page 9 of this paper, Komer cited:
{1)

The placing of eighty wells and 60 potable water systems

in villages and district towns;
(2)

Improvement of mechanisms of providing credit to the

farmer and to the small businessman;

(3)

The distribution of 26 1 000 pigs of improved varieties

of Yorkshire and Berkshire;

(4)

A pilot program for distributing 14,000 acres in

An Giang is proceeding(a step toward land reform).

,.......

~
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TAB B
VIETNAM REVOLUTIONA RY DEVELOPMENT CADRE
The te rm 11 ~adre 11 , as us ed in t he Vi e t nam Revo luti onary Devel opment
( RD) program, r e fers to villagers who have ' be en t r ained and employed as nonp~ rrna,n ~ nt Vi.ei.n~EL.Q:Qyer_p_D).§.!l~- ~ rs o!'!n§ll and qss j gned t o w,2,r.k in their
~~r_§_gS whicl}_h_a.:~~-~-~-~!12~-g-~_ntly..cl.eared._Q.f_ __lar.ge_ll.a,£__C QDg_ _g_~e_i~J1Ia
fq_!'_'~_~ s.
They perform t he foll owing tasks: (l ) serve as <>; channel through
whi ch c ontact is reestablished be twe en the n·ati onal government and t he rural
populatio n; (2) assist the people i n reestablishing t heir normal way of l ife
and the fabric of local soc i e ty; ( 3 ) assist them in i mproving their basic
livlng condi tio ns ; (4 ) facilitate t he reestablis hment and operati on of popul a~' l y ,-; r;; lected village /haml et gove rnme nts and (5 ) explain the gove r nmen t's
pn,gram to the . rural peopl e ..
On January l , 1966, t he Vi e t names e Go ve rnmen~ c c ombi n e d se veral
previ ously· c,xic;ting s pe cial types of cadre into one R);) profQ'am· The va r ious
t ypes of c ad r e previ ous l y worke d as i ndividual uni ts r es pons i ble fo r impl e ment i ng a vari ety of pr oj ec ts wi thi n the overall rural constru ct:i. on program.
In gt nc r al they s uffe r ed from l ac k of centralized co nt r ol a nd direc t-i onj
inadeq·Lia-Le t r ainin g and poorly defined r espons i bili t i es. These var i ous types
of cadre are now being re- train ed and phased into t he ne:v-1 r evolu t i onary
devel opment c adre gr oups.
The

M\!ll~_ry_of Re_yo~uti o~~!X D~vel opme_~:f?. .J_§_Qfl~rga.d_ ID.th. .c.a r.rying

9~-.T~Q.r.ganiz.a.t-¥m,

trai ni ng and de ployment of the ll~li.JID. cadre , IIT:.I.f.."W·s .
Tr aining t he new c adr e i s done at the ~ational Training Cen t er a t V~
The training programs include a t l east one group from each provin ce. If
t he r e is a singl e theme to the training program, it is t o in s till and promote
a nati onal spirit, awarene s s and dedication in the people of Vie tnam. RD _
cadre · are t aught t hey are the link between t he Gove rnment of Vi e tnam. and ·,.t he
rural p~op l e . The7 pledge thems elves to the deve lopment of rural Vie tnam .

The bas~c t rainin g c~~ te aches t he new cadre ab out Viet Gong
ope rations, in f ra:s'truc t ur e . and influence, t he e r adi cation of whi ch becomes
thei r primar y goa l. They are t aught that ther e a r e othe r n ati o n ~ assi s ting
Vi etnam, not as a: 'fo rm· of r e-col oni zation, but as as sis tanc e t o the people
agai nst t he enemy and i n support of the social r evolution . Cadr e membe rs
are given rigorous physical trainin g and a r e taught the use of vari ous a rms
and s mall un it tactics . Fin ally, they are taught t ha t their pri nc ipal
we apon is poli t ic al action .
The second part of Vung Tau trai ning is divided into spe cializ ed
offered f or t he vari on s t ypes of t earw; : (l) militia, ( 2 ) civi c action,
(3) NewJkife DevelQDment . Thes e te ams make up the ~sic structure of ea ch
59-man RD cad rQ_giQ up. I n additi on , a l eade rshi p course is given to those
seiected as-~st qualifi ed to serve as the command element.

a~

/
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EaGh of the component teams has a different responsibility, but
every member is expected to know the other's job and if nee ded, to be able
to replace anyone in the Group. The teams are expected to operate as a
coordinated Group.
Within the group organization, the militia teams have as their
primary duty, the job of detec ting and eliminating the Viet Gong political/
military infrastructure. It is also their duty to organize and train a
hamlet self-defense force and to assist in meeting needs of the rural population in the fields of social welfare, health and education.
The Civil Action Teams survey and class ify the area being secured.
They identify and r egiste r t he village/hamlet people. (In Vi e tnam a village
is made up of a group of hamlets. The RD cadre will operate at both t he
vill age and hamlet l evel.) Their job is to record not only the physi cal
f acto r s , b11 t to also identify the op:Lnions and as pirat:Lon s of the pe ople,
b oth fri e nd and enemy . Their job is also to make loc al government honest
and eff ec t ive . They urge t he participation of the peopl e in organi zing
hamlet adm:Lni strative committees, people's councils and people's organizati ons base d on age and inte rest groups. Their j ob is ultimately to help
the people hold el e ctions to se l ect their own l eade r s for local government.
The mate ri al pr ogress of the village/hamlet i s the responsibility
QL Htb.D.__}Jew LifeTie~eaiilS.- This t as k includes teaching and guid:ii1g
tho people to a vai l thems elve s of government sponsored program..s of social
and economic devel opme nt . Thes e teams organize self- hel p projects and bring
i n di rect assis t ance from the various government agencie s in t he form of
technical advic e and material aid s uch as improved seeds, fert ilizers and
equipment. Through se lf-help projects where government agenci es provide
the mate ri al s and the village/hamlet provides the labor, the rural people
acquire thei r own schools, medical clinics and similar fac ilities . The teams
als o assist the local people and local officials in implementing the GVN land
r efor m pr ograms and in stimulating cooperatives and cottage industries.
Followi ng satisfactory completion of the training course the cadre
groups undergo two additional weeks of training in their home provinces and
are then assigned to villages or hamle ts in the same provinc es which have
been selected t o participate in RD in accordance with an annual plan developed
at the Provincial level and approved by the Central Government authorities.
Generally these will be villages or hamlets in areas which GVN or other free
world military forces have recently cleared of Viet Gong mainforce elements
or areas previously cleared but in which GVN civil authority has not yet
been firmly established. The cadre groups will remain in the village or
hamle t f or whatever length of time is necessary to remove all vestiges of
Viet Gong authority and to firmly reestablish a capable locally elected
gove rning body which is operating effectively and is in continuing productive
contact with GVN appointed authorities at the District and Province levels.
The Province Chiefs support the cadre groups once t4ey are in the field.

·..,:

'
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~~~----~-~~~.Ji£~038~~ It is estimated that in some cases it will
be necessary for the cadre to remain on the scene for a year or more. In
addition, it takes time to recruit, train and field the cadre groups required
to support the total RD effort. Thus immediate dramatic results cannot and
should not be expected from the new approach and set-backs are inevitable.
However, many of the weaknesses of earlier attempts at using cadre in support
of the Vie tnamese pacification program have been recognized by Vietnamese
authorities and have been taken into account in developing the new approach.
A few months ago the motto "Let's work slowly but firmly" was suggested at
a Seminar of Province Chiefs held in Saigon to consider the general subject
of RD. This certainly should be the watchword where cadre are concerned
sinc e previous expe rienc e has shown success cannot be achieved in any other
way.

19.

Appendix III.
Effects of pacification
on the civilian population
Certain authorities have expressed concern over the
advisability of the use of pacification; Jllethods in such
a culture as that of Viet Nam.

On page 158 of Jean

Lacoutre's VietNam between two tpuces, the leading French
authority on Indochina states:
"In this ancient country to jeopa rdize the village
structure by setting up artificial agglomerations is to
break the b a ckbone of the country its elf, to go against its
collective conscience; its · beliefs ,_, and its homogeneity at
the deepest level;

this is particularly true if this

system of intensive organi zation, and close and p e rmanent
control..- • • destroys the family cell, that other basic fact
of Vietnamese society."
I have also included a New York Times News Service
article on the village of Khanhvan and relevant comments
by I.F. Stone.
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Pttcifiers Arrive and Pledge .to .Stay,~
For 5th Time,in key Vietnam Vii/Qge
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Why the. Constituent Assembly .Is As Undemoeratle A Farce as rrhe Mllituy

What "Pacification" Really Means to Vietnam's Landless Peasantry

)

'

\

In Vietnam, as in W-ashington, semantic trickery is the order o£ the day, "Pacification'' means subjugation, and "Revolutionary Development Cadres"-the agents of pacificationare really counter-revolutionary police teams to subjugate the
.
· :wi - -- ' if in ;
peasant. - "4:het__ 1_ndlord
t~~ writes Fred Emery, Saigon correspondent of the
London Times -(March 10), "not merely to grab bade their
lands but to extort back rents for the time they fled the Vietcong."
a Ngo Dinh· Diem la:w. of 19:55 lim,its rents
o 25% Qf the crop, Emery notes that. ·landlords still extort
ents aS. high as 60% of the p.roduCt
a rice field" and adds
~'it is not hard to see why peasants keep their arms."
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Emery says "It may seriously be questioned whether any
progress of lasting nature can be expected, in spite of military successes, so long as pacification continues without a real
revolution in the Government's attitude towards land .reform."
He notes that "it is pos~ible to listen to a senior 0C0 [Office
of Civilian Operations; which handles the civilian end of the
U.S. effort in South Vietnam] official talk for 90 mi.nutes
without once menbioning land-just as the subject has not
found favor in the new Constituent Assembly." Emery fails
to recognize that the Constituent Assembly is dominated by
landlords, and that .the American government has no real
1
enthusiasm for land reform, especially since it would undercut
''
the only class which supports the 'u.S. in the countryside.
The spectacle of landlords returning with the "pacification"
. ~/ll teams to take back the land and collect back rents can hardly .
,endear us to the peasants. "Senior American officials recognize the problem only too well," Emery writes, "and say,
/ -- rather nervously, they are hoping the Government will sh,ortly
come up with a decree abolishing back rents." . The "government" .is the mili-tary junta. The Generals are either of, or
linked to, the landlord class. To expect them to abolish bade
rents is as foolish as to expect them to decree land reform.
'_ ..~ ___ _!_i_chard Critchfield in the Washington Stmday Star (March
~) recalls that a year ago in Honolulu Johnson ·plaiged "social
revolution, including land reform", [Critchfield writes that
the last three words were not in the original State Department
draft for ·the Honolulu declaration but were added on "the
insistence of the American counter-insurgency expert, Major
General Edward G. Lansdale, Jr."]
Land ref<?!:!P was supposed .to be the cornerstone of the n------V
"r.;,olutionary development program," but when Dr. Ph~T
~ ·-·-····
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The· Kind of Regime Washington Ukes .
~Rio de .Janeiro-This ia tbe eountrJ that 1... tlwa
three 7ean ago threatened to become not merelJ aother Cuba but perhape IJOIIlething doee to another Red
. China. • • • To be sure the mllitaey regiae , •• has been
no model of democratic: permilaiTett... Br..ruan journalist. deemed too unfriendly to &he gonruaent . .,
find the....eiTea behhld ban•••• More imp011aat .tlwl
dictatorial hQeTolettce are the clear aigu 9f iaproT•
lng healtll being shown bJ the economJ•••• Price in.
c:reaae~~ .- eYf'Jthiag. (rom d\ic:ken f.-.1 to nen_papen
atiU oeeut replarly. The fOT.,..meht prlatblg ~
continae to :Qba out crueiroe • • • bat u.s. a.... .,..
lu4bag the ba.netment parade. • • • Un4er a new JD,. .
n.t-... -......... a......-eat wiU., ... u.s_ ....u
since "19&5- [when the miUtaey took onr-IFS] lau
appro't'M more than Slit aDHola worth of ..., proj.._
bJ U.S. ar.. ... beside the rules Umltblr paJ ...,
Q'eaaea to peremtages weU below the rate at whkh the
eo.t o_f li•ing ia riaing, there ia an almost total prohlllltion against lltrikes."
-Wall Street Joumal, Mt~rch 9

~~pro_posed that the Cc>Q!~~on
~tee ~.-!Y Victnamqe ~ the right to own the iiUia'"
h~tilled, ~-~~onjy__ i_
117 votes. "Many
deputies," Ctitchfield writes," said it souil.dea-.-too'much like
communism.' He says later Dr. Dan "succeeded in getting
much milder proviso adopted pledging government help to
the landless." · But this (we discovered recently) says only
(Art. XX) "The State advocates raising the standard of living
of rural citizens, and especially helping farmers to have farmland." Just how is left unclear. .Article XVIII guarantees
the right of private property and says "expropriation or
requisition for the common good must be accompanied by
speedy and just compensation at price levels existing at the
time of expropriation or requisition.'' This makes it impos·
sible to pay for land reform in bonds nor to buy land at its
original (J)St or tu valuation or even to take into account that
it may -bave · beeo acquired -unlAwfully. Such awtil\ltiooal
prov~ons ·are an obstacle to peaceful -land reform in Latin
America..
--. In dae Mekong_Q!_lta, Critchfield writes, ~0 ~~~
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~asant~!- entirely landl~d 8~~-~gt-.L
~1 _e_~_~_ffieiirtcelands. Thus {or the ma-jority of ·the
people the ~dlora:a-ooi"ioaled Constituent Assembly ~ as
unrepresentative a farce as the military junta.
v

:,~i~\, In Latin America, Too, Talk of Land Reform Doesn't Mateh the Realities
"len wh01t~,- - fathers for generations have worked land the land ref~rm agency acquired or expropriatf'CI with eomownect by others now work It as their own."
- LBJ's message to Ctmgress on Latin America )!arch 13
"The implementation of legialatlon atree_ti.n g the aJrarian
is still slow; the di!Jtribu~Q .o f .laJtd ' apd other
productive resources among the ,urJtl: populaUdn remains
very unequal, and potentfaftJ p'rodUfti:vt'-UlDd, ·water and
human resources are seriousl7 underutll&ed in the rural
areas•..• Among the variou11 types of land reform, slowest progress in 19&6 was land redistributiqn•. In Colombia,
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pensation oniJ 21,000 hectare. • • • and established Uttle
more than 2,000 families. • • • In Chile only 1881 famillea
~eived falaOJ-size parcels. . - • In the Dommlean Republie, although ~~everal hundred thouB&nd heetares of fertOe
land are in the P,G~MUion of the Agradan m.&l&ute, the
rate of &Jstematie tet.tlement is currently onlJ 1,080 f....
ilies a Jtar, or ._.than 0.5 percent of the numher of tamiUes workbag Oil aublilltenee traeta of one heetare or leu.

-Si:l:th Anttut.rl ·RepOrl, 1181, 8oci1Sl Pro1ff'61f Trut
Fund, lttter-Am8r.ice&n D11"elopment Bank, rele"o.ed llltl.'r. Ji.

